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Abstract
We consider data poisoning attacks, a class of adversarial attacks on machine learning where
an adversary has the power to alter a small fraction of the training data in order to make the
trained classifier satisfy certain objectives. While there has been much prior work on data
poisoning, most of it is in the offline setting, and attacks for online learning, where training
data arrives in a streaming manner, are not well understood.
In this work, we initiate a systematic investigation of data poisoning attacks for online
learning. We formalize the problem into two settings, and we propose a general attack strategy,
formulated as an optimization problem, that applies to both with some modifications. We
propose three solution strategies, and perform extensive experimental evaluation. Finally, we
discuss the implications of our findings for building successful defenses.
1 Introduction
As machine learning algorithms are increasing used in security-critical applications, there is a growing
need to design them with active adversaries in mind. A class of adversarial attacks on machine
learning that have received much attention is data poisoning attacks [21, 20, 19, 4, 7, 11]. Here,
an adversary is aware of the learner’s training data and algorithm, and has the power to alter a
small fraction of the training data in order to make the trained classifier satisfy certain objectives.
For example, a sabotage adversary may try to degrade the overall accuracy of the trained classifier
as part of an industrial sabotage campaign, or a profit-oriented adversary may try to poison the
training data so that the resulting model favors it – say, by recommending the its products over
others.
While there has been a long line of prior work on data poisoning [21, 20, 19, 4, 7, 11, 3, 8], most
of it has focussed in the offline setting, where a classifier or some other model is trained on a fixed
input. In many applications of machine learning however, training is done online as data arrives
sequentially in a stream; data poisoning attacks in this context are not well-understood.
In this work, we initiate a systematic investigation of data poisoning attacks for online learning.
We begin by formalizing the problem into two settings, semi-online and fully-online, that reflect
two separate use cases for online learning algorithms. In the semi-online setting, only the classifier
obtained at the end of training is used downstream, and hence the adversary’s objective involves only
this final classifier. In the fully-online setting, the classifiers is updated and evaluated continually,
corresponding to applications where an agent continually learns and adapts to a changing environment
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– for example, a tool predicting price changes in the stock market. In this case, the adversary’s
objective involves classifiers accumulated over the entire online window.
We next consider online classification via online gradient descent, and formulate the adversary’s
attack strategy as an optimization problem; our formulation covers both semi-online and fully-online
settings with suitable modifications and applies quite generally to a number of attack objectives. We
show that this formulation has two critical differences with the corresponding offline formulation [11]
that lead to a difference in solution approaches. The first is that unlike the offline case where
the estimated classifier is the minimizer of an empirical risk, here the classifier is a much more
complex function of the data stream which makes gradient computation time-consuming.The second
difference is that data order now matters, which implies that modifying training points at certain
positions in the stream may yield high benefits; this property can be potentially exploited by a
successful attack to reduce the search space.
We then propose a solution that uses three key steps. First, we simplify the optimization problem
by smoothing the objective function and using a novel trick called label inversion if needed. Second,
we recursively compute the gradient using Chain rule. The third and final step is to narrow down
the search space of gradient ascent by modifying data points at certain positions in the input stream.
We propose three such modification schemes – the Incremental Attack which corresponds to an
online version of the greedy scheme, the Interval Attack which corresponds to finding the best
consecutive sequence to modify, and finally a Teach-and-Reinforce Attack, which seeks to teach a
classifier that adheres to the adversary’s goal by selectively modifying inputs in the beginning of the
data stream, and then reinforce the teaching by uniformly modifying inputs along the rest of the
stream.
Finally, we carry out detailed experimentation which evaluates these attacks in the context of an
adversary who seeks to degrade the classification error for four data sets, two settings (semi-online
and fully-online) as well as three styles of learning rates. Our experiments demonstrate that online
adversaries are indeed significantly more powerful in this context than adversaries who are oblivious
to the online nature of the problem. Additionally, we show that the severity of the attacks depend
on the learning rate as well as the setting; online learners with rapidly decaying learning rates are
more susceptible to attacks, and so is the semi-online setting. We conclude with a brief discussion
about the implication of our work for constructing effective defenses.
Related Work. Prior work on data poisoning has mostly looked at offline learning algorithms.
This includes attacks on spam filters [13] and malware detection [15] to more recent work on
sentiment analysis [14] and collaborative filtering [8]. [2] developed the first gradient-ascent-based
poisoning attack on offline SVMs; this technique was later extended to neural networks [12]. Mei and
Zhu [11] propose a general optimization framework for poisoning attacks in the offline setting; they
show how to use KKT conditions to efficiently calculate the gradients for gradient ascent. While our
work is inspired by [2] and [11], the optimization problem in our case is considerably more complex
and the KKT conditions in [11] no longer apply. Finally, Steinhardt et al. [17] proposes a certified
defense against offline data poisoning attacks.
In contrast, little is known about poisoning attacks in more online and adaptive settings. The
work closest to ours is [4], which poisons a data stream so that the final classifier misclassifies a
pre-specified input; in contrast, our settings are more general. [1] attacks an autoregressive model
to yield desired outputs by altering the initial input; however their attack does not alter the model
parameters, nor does it have access to the training process. Steinhardt et al. [17] uses an online
learning framework to generate a poisoning data set, but their attack and certified defense both
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apply to offline learning algorithms. Lastly, [6] and [9] consider attacks against an reinforcement
learning agent. However, the attacks only provide adversarial examples at test time using gradient
methods; the policies are already learned and the attacker has no access to the training process.
2 The Setting
2.1 The Classification Setting and Algorithm
We consider online learning for binary linear classification. Specifically, we have instances x drawn
from the instance space Rd, and binary labels y ∈ {−1,+1}. A linear classifier is represented by
a weight vector w; for an instance x, it predicts a label sgn(w>x). For a particular classification
problem, this weight vector w is determined based on training data.
In offline learning, the weight vector w is learnt by minimizing a convex empirical loss ` on
training data plus a regularizer Ω(w). In contrast, in online learning – the setting of this paper – the
training data set S arrives in a stream {(x0, y0), . . . , (xt, yt), . . .}; starting with an initial w0, at time
t, the weight vector wt is iteratively updated to wt+1 based on the current example St = (xt, yt).
Since the classical work of [10], there has been a large body of work in online learning in a number
of settings [5]. In this work, we consider online learning in a distributional setting where each (xt, yt)
is independently drawn from an underlying data distribution D. As our learning procedure, we
select the popular Online Gradient Descent (OGD) algorithm [22], which at time t, performs the
following update:
wt+1 = wt − ηt(∇`(wt, (xt, yt)) +∇Ω(wt)),
Recall that here ` is a convex loss function, and Ω is a regularizer. For example, in the popular
L2-regularized logistic regression, ` is the logistic function: `(w, (x, y)) = log(1 + e−yw
>x) and
Ω(w) = c2‖w‖2 for some constant c. In addition, ηt is a learning rate that typically diminishes over
time. We use T to denote the length of the data stream.
2.2 The Attacker
Following prior work on data poisoning [11, 7], we consider a white-box adversary. Specifically,
the adversary knows the entire data stream (including data order), the model class, the training
algorithm, any hyperparameters and any defenses that may be employed. Armed with this knowledge,
the adversary has the power to arbitrarily modify at most K examples (xt, yt) in the stream. While
this is a strong assumption, it has been used in a number of prior works [11, 7, 2, 4]. Security by
obscurity is well-known to be bad practice and to lead to pit-falls [3]. Additionally, adversaries can
often reverse-engineer the parameters of a machine learning system [18, 16].
We consider two different styles of attack objectives – semi-online and fully-online – that
correspond to two different practical uses of online learning. In the sequel, we use the notation f(w)
to denote an attack objective function that depends on a specific weight vector w.
Semi-Online. Here, the attacker seeks to modify the training data stream so as to maximize
its objective f(wT ) on the classifier wT obtained at the end of training. This setting is applicable
when an online or streaming algorithm is used to train a classifier, which is then used directly in a
downstream application.
Here, the training phase uses an online algorithm but the evaluation of the objective is only at
the end of the stream. Compared to the classic offline data-poisoning attack setting [2, 17], the
attacker now has the extra knowledge on the order in which training data is processed.
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Fully-online. Here, the attacker seeks to modify the training data so as to maximize the
accumulated objectives over the entire online learning window. More specifically, the attacker’s goal
is to now maximize
∑T
t=1 f(wt).
This setting is called fully-online because both the training process and the evaluation of the
objective are online. It corresponds to adversaries in applications where an agent continually learns
online, thus constantly adapting to a changing environment; an example of such a learner is a
financial tool predicting price changes in the stock market.
An Example Attack Objective: Classification Error. Our algorithm and ideas apply to a
number of objective functions f ; however, for specificity, while explaining our attack, we will consider
an adversary whose objective is the classification error achieved by the classifier output by the online
learner:
f(w) = Pr
(x,y)∼D
(sgn(w>x) 6= y) = E
(x,y)∼D
[1(sgn(w>x) 6= y)] (1)
The Feasible Set Defense. Following prior work [2, 17] will also assume that the learner employs
a feasible set defense, where each example (xt, yt) on arrival is projected on to a feasible set F of
bounded diameter. This defense rules out trivial attacks where outlier examples with very high
norm may be used to arbitrarily modify a classifier at training time. Observe that under the feasible
set defense, it is sufficient to consider adversaries which only alter training points to other points
inside the feasible set F .
For the purpose of this work, we will consider F = [−1, 1]d × {−1, 1}.
3 Attack Methods
In the setting described above, finding the attacker’s optimal strategy reduces to solving a certain
attack optimization problem. We begin by describing this problem.
In the sequel, given a data stream S, we use the notation St to denote the t-th labeled example
in the stream. Additionally, the difference between two data streams S and S′, denoted by S \ S′, is
defined as the set {St|St 6= S′t}; its cardinality |S \ S′| is the number of of time steps t for which
St 6= S′t.
3.1 Attacker’s Optimization Problem
Under this notation, the attacker’s optimal strategy under an input data stream Strain in the
semi-online case can be described as the solution to the following optimization problem.
max
S∈FT
f(wT ) (2)
subject to: |S \ Strain| ≤ K, (3)
wt = w0 −
t−1∑
τ=0
ητ (∇`(wτ , Sτ ) +∇Ω(wτ )), 1 ≤ t ≤ T (4)
Here, (3) ensures that at most K examples in the input data stream are changed, and (4) ensures
that wt is the OGD iterate at time t. In the fully online case, the objective changes to
∑T
t=1 f(wt).
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3.2 Attack Algorithm
Challenges and Our Approach. Observe that this optimization problem has some similarities
to the corresponding offline problem derived by [11]. However, there are two important differences
that leads to a difference in solution approaches.
The first is that unlike the offline case where the estimated weight vector is the minimizer of an
empirical risk, here wt is a more complex function of the data stream S. This has two consequences
that make gradient computation more challenging – first, changing xt now influences all later wτ for
τ > t; second, the KKT conditions that were exploited by prior work [2, 17, 7] for easy computation
no longer hold. The second difference from the offline case is that data order now matters, which
implies that modifying training points at certain positions in the stream may yield high benefits.
This property could be potentially exploited by a successful attack to reduce the search space. We
next provide a solution approach that involves three steps, corresponding to three key ideas.
The first key idea is to simplify the optimization problem and make it amenable for gradient
ascent; this is done by smoothing the objective function and using a novel tool called label inversion
if needed. The second idea is to compute the gradient of the objective function with respect to
points in the data stream by use of the chain rule and recursion. Finally, our third key idea is to
narrow the search space by confining our search to specific positions in the data stream. We next
describe each of these steps.
Idea 1: Simplify Optimization Problem. We begin by observing that in many cases, the
objective function (2) may not be suited for gradient ascent. An example is the classification error
objective function (1); being a 0/1 loss, it is non-differentiable, and second, it involves an expectation
over D which we cannot compute as D is generally unknown. In these cases, we smooth the objective
function using standard tools – we use a convex surrogate, the logistic loss, instead of the 0/1 loss,
and evaluating the expectation over a separate validation data set Svalid [2].
However, the surrogate to the classification loss objective (1) still has local maxima at the
constant classifier. To address this, we propose a novel tool – label inversion. Instead of maximizing
logistic loss on the validation set, we construct an inverted validation set Svalidinv, which contains,
for each (x, y) in the validation set, an example (x,−y). We then maximize the negative of the
logistic loss on this inverted validation set.
Formally, for an example (x, y) and a weight vector w, let L(w, (x, y)) denote the negative logistic
loss L(w, (x, y)) = − log(1 + exp(−yw>x)). For the semi-online case, the objective (2) reduces to
maxS∈FT L(S) = maxS∈FT
∑
(x,y)∈Svalidinv L(wT , (x, y)). Intuitively, this encourages the attacker
to modify the data stream to fit a dataset whose labels are inverted with respect to the original
data distribution. Again, an analogous objective can be derived for the fully online case.
Idea 2: Compute Gradients via Chain Rule. The next challenge is how to compute the
gradient of the objective function with respect to a training point (xt, yt) at position t. Unlike the
offline case, this is more challenging as the KKT conditions can no longer be used, and the gradient
depends on position t. Our second observation is that this can still be achieved by judicious use of
the chain rule.
We first observe that in the computation of any wτ , replacing a training point (xt, yt) with
(−xt,−yt) leads to exactly the same result; this is due to symmetry of the feasible set as well as
the OGD algorithm. We therefore choose to keep the label yt’s fixed in the training set, and only
optimize over the feature vector xts.
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Let F (wt) denote a (possibly) smoothed version of the objective f evaluated at the t-th iterate
wt; using Chain Rule we can write:
∂F (wt)
∂xi
=

0 if i ≥ t
∂F (wt)
∂wt
∂wt
∂xi
if i = t− 1
∂F (wt)
∂wt
∂wt
∂wt−1
· · · ∂wi+2∂wi+1
∂wi+1
∂xi
if i < t− 1.
 (5)
Observe that the term ∂F (wt)/∂wt and ∂wi+1/∂xi may be calculated directly, and the product
∂F (wt)
∂wt
· ∂wt∂wt−1 · · ·
∂wi+2
∂wi+1
may be calculated via t− i matrix-vector multiplications. Finally, we observe
that since the gradients ∂F (wt)/∂xi and ∂F (wt)/∂xi+1 share the prefix as shown in Appendix A.1
and hence the gradients {∂F (wt)/∂xi} for all i may be computed in O(Td2) time. A detailed
derivation of the general case, as well as specific expressions for the surrogate loss to classification
error, is presented in the Appendix A.2.
Idea 3: Strategic Search over Positions in the Stream. So far, we have calculated the
impact of modifying a single point (xt, yt) on the objective function; a remaining question is which
data points in the input stream to modify. Recall that in a data stream of length T , there are
potentially
(
T
K
)
subsequences of K inputs to modify, and a brute force search over all of them
is prohibitively expensive. We present below three algorithms for strategically searching over
positions in the stream for attack purposes – the Incremental Attack, the Interval Attack and the
Teach-and-Reinforce Attack.
A first idea is to consider a greedy approach, which iteratively alters the training point in the
sequence that has the highest gradient magnitude. While this has been considered by prior work for
offline settings, we next derive how to do this in an online setting. This results in what we call the
Incremental Attack.
Incremental Attack. This attack employs an iterative steepest coordinate descent approach. In
each iteration, we calculate the gradient of the modified objective with respect to each single training
point, and pick the (xt, yt) with the largest gradient magnitude. This example is then updated as:
xt ← projF (xt + ∂F/∂xt),
where  is a step size parameter, F is the objective function, and proj is the projection operator.
The process continues until either K distinct points are modified or convergence. The full algorithm
is described in Algorithm 1 in the Appendix.
Observe however that the greedy approach has two limitations. The first is that since it does
not narrow the search space using the online nature of the problem, it involves a large number of
iterations and is computationally expensive. The second is that it is known to be prone to local
minima as observed by prior work in the offline setting. [17]
Interval Attack. To address these limitations, we next propose a novel strategy that is tailored to
the online setting, called the Interval Attack. The idea here is to find the best consecutive sequence
(xt, yt), . . . , (xt+K−1, yt+K−1) modifying which decreases the objective function the most.
More specifically, the search process is as follows. For each t ∈ {0, . . . , T −K − 1}, the algorithm
computes the concatenated gradient [∂F/∂xt, · · · , ∂F/∂xt+K−1] and carries out the following update
until convergence or until a maximum number of iterations is reached:
[xt, · · · , xt+K−1]← projFK ([xt, · · · , xt+K−1] + [∂F/∂xt, · · · , ∂F/∂xt+K−1]),
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where  is again a step-size parameter. The value of t for which the final [xt, . . . , xt+K−1] gives the
best objective (2) is then selected.
Teach-and-Reinforce Attack. Even though the Interval attack is faster than the Incremental, it
has the highest impact on the performance of the classifiers wt′ for t′ close to t. In particular, it
is suboptimal in the fully online case, where the objective is the sum of the losses of all wt. This
motivates our third attack strategy – the Teach-and-Reinforce Attack, which seeks to first teach a
new classifier by modifying a set of initial examples, and then reinforce the teaching by modifying
examples along the rest of the data stream.
We split K, the number of examples to be modified, into two parts αK and (1 − α)K. We
then modify the first αK points in the stream, followed by every s-th remaining point, where
s = d T−αK(1−α)K e. As in previous attacks, once the attack positions are determined, the algorithm
iteratively finds the best modification through gradient ascent followed by projection to the feasible
set. The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 3. Finally, the optimal value of α is determined
through a grid search. Observe that α = 0 corresponds to modifying points over an uniform grid of
positions in the stream, and hence the performance of Teach-and-Reinforce is at least as good as
this case.
4 Experiments
We now evaluate the proposed attacks experimentally to determine their practical performance. In
particular, we consider the following three questions:
1. How effective are the proposed gradient ascent-based online adversaries relative to adversaries
who are oblivious to the online nature of the learning process, and adversaries that simply
invert training labels?
2. Which positions in the data stream are predominantly attacked by the online adversaries?
3. How does attack performance vary with the setting (semi-online vs fully-online) and learning
rate?
These questions are investigated in the context of the classification error objective for four data
sets, two settings (semi-online and fully-online) as well as three styles of learning rates.
4.1 Experimental Methodology
Baselines. We implement the three proposed online attacks – Incremental, Interval and Teach-
and-Reinforce – in both semi-online and fully-online settings. For computational efficiency, in the
fully-online setting, we use the objective function
∑
t∈G f(wt) where G is a regular grid containing
every 10-th integer.
Additionally, we consider two baselines – the Offline attack and the Label-flip Attack. The
Offline attacker represents an adversary who is oblivious to the streaming nature of the input. It
uses the method of [2] to generate K additional attack points. Since their method generates points
for adding to the training data, and our input stream is fixed-length, we replace a random set of K
positions in the stream with the newly generated points. The Label Flip attack selects K points
from the input stream, and flips their labels. We use three strategies for selecting the positions
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of these points – head-flip (initial K positions in the stream), tail-flip (the final K positions), and
random. To keep the figures understandable, we report the best outcome acheived by the three
strategies.
Datasets. We select four datasets – a synthetic dataset consisting of a 2-dimensional mixture of
spherical Gaussians, MNIST, fashion MNIST and UCI Spambase. To reduce the running time, we
project both MNIST and fashion MNIST to 50 dimensions via random projections. For MNIST, we
use the 1 vs. 7 classification task, and for fashion MNIST, the sandals vs. boots task.
Parameter Choice. The online learner has three parameters of interest – the initial classifier
w0, the regularization function, and the learning rate ηt. We set the initial classifier w0 in Online
Gradient Descent to a logistic regression classifier trained offline on a held-out dataset. For all cases,
we use L2 regularization Ω(w) = λ2 ‖w‖2 with parameter λ = 0.4. We consider three choices for
learning rate – Constant (where ηt = η0), Slow Decay (where ηt = η0/
√
t) and Fast Decay (where
ηt = η0/λt) – in accordance with standard practices. η0 is chosen to ensure that in all cases, the
online learner has more than 90% test accuracy when run on the clean data stream.
The gradient based attack algorithms also involve a step size parameter , which is initially set
to
√
d/100 where d is the data dimension, and then decays as
√
d/[100
√
1 + (t/20)]. Finally, the
hyper-parameter α in the Teach-and-Reinforce attack is chosen by grid search from {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75};
observe that α = 0 corresponds to modifying points over an uniform grid of positions in the stream.
4.2 Results
Figures 1 show the attack results for synthetic, MNIST and Spambase for the Slow decay learning
rate; the remaining figures are in the Appendix B.2. Each plotted point reports average test accuracy
as a function of the fraction of modified points, and is an average over 8 runs. Table 1 provides a
qualitative description of the positions in the stream that are attacked by the different methods,
with full histograms in the Appendix B.3.
The figures show that the Incremental and Interval attacks are overall the most effective in the
semi-online case, while Teach-and-Reinforce is overall the most effective in the fully-online case.
Additionally, the gradient ascent-based online attacks are highly effective for all datasets (except for
the synthetic 2-d mixture of Gaussians), and have higher performance than the position-oblivious
Offline attack as well as the Label Flip attack. Finally, the positions attacked by Incremental and
Interval attacks do change as a function of the setting (semi-online vs. fully-online) and learning
rate style. In the semi-online case, for Slow Decay and Constant, the attacks modify points towards
the end of the stream, while in the fully-online case, the modified points are chosen towards the
beginning. In constrast, for Fast Decay, the points modified are chosen from the beginning of the
stream in both cases.
4.2.1 Discussion
We now revisit our initial questions in light of these results.
Comparison with Oblivious Adversaries and Label Flip Adversaries. Both Offline and
Label Flip fail to perform as well as the best online attack. This implies that an adversary who
can exploit the online nature of the problem can produce better attacks than an oblivious one.
Additionally, gradient ascent procedures are indeed necessary for high performance, and simple label
flipping does not suffice.
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Implications of Attack Positions. We find that the positions modified by the Incremental and
Interval attacks are highly concentrated in the semi-online case. This implies that we may be able
to narrow down the search space of attack positions in this case. However, such short-cuts may not
yield high performance in the fully-online case.
Impact of Setting and Learning Rates. The setting (semi-online vs. fully-online) and learning
rates significantly impact the results. The results there imply that first, the Incremental Attack
suffers from local minima which are mitigated by Teach-and-Reinforce, and second, the semi-online
setting may be easier to attack than fully-online. Additionally, the efficacy of all three online attacks
is higher in the Fast Decay case than Slow Decay or Constant, which suggests that Fast Decay
learning rates may be particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
4.2.2 Implications for Defenses
Our experiments show that the semi-online setting is more vulnerable than the fully-online setting,
and the Fast Decay learning rate is also more vulnerable than Slow Decay or Constant Decay. We
conjecture that this is because the classifier wT in the semi-online setting depends heavily on a
relatively smaller number of training points than the fully-online setting. A similar explanation
applies to Fast Decay; because the learning rate decays rapidly, the classifiers produced depend
rather critically on the few initial points.
Based on these results, we therefore recommend the use of online methods where no one classifier
depends heavily on a few input points; we conjecture that these methods would be less vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. An example of such a method is the averaged stochastic gradient classifier,
where the classifier used in iteration t is the average 2t
∑t
s=t/2 ws. An open question for future work
is to investigate the vulnerability of this method.
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Figure. 1: Test accuracy vs. fraction of modified points for each attack on an online learner with
Slow Decay learning rate. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Fully-online. Left to right: 2D
Gaussian mixture, MNIST 1 v.s. 7, UCI Spambase.
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Incremental Interval Teach-and-Reinforce
Semi-online Fully-online Semi-online Fully-online Semi-online Fully-online
Fast Decay Start Start Start Start 0.75 0.75
Constant End Start/Uniform 1 End Start 0 0.25/0.75 2
Slow Decay End Start/Uniform1 End Start 0 0/0.75 2
Table 1: Attack positions chosen by each online attack against an online learner in different settings.
We use ‘Start’, ‘End’ and ‘Uniform’ to qualitatively represent whether most attack positions are at
the beginning, end or uniformly distributed over the stream. The most frequent α is reported for
Teach-and-Reinforce.
5 Conclusion
We initiate the study of data poisoning attacks in the context of online learning. We formalize the
problem to abstract out two settings of interest – semi-online and fully-online. In both cases, we
formulate the attacker’s strategy as an optimization problem and propose solution strategies. Our
experiments show that our attacks perform significantly better than an attacker who is oblivious to
the online nature of the input data.
There are many avenues for further investigation – such as, extending our attacks to more
complex classifiers such as neural networks, and building online defenses. Finally, online learning is
closely related to other problems on learning from feedback, such as contextual bandits. We believe
that a very interesting open question is to expand our understanding to better understand the role
and capabilities of adversaries in these systems.
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A Derivation and Description of Attack Algorithms
A.1 Gradient Computation Using an Recurrent Prefix
Equation 5 shows the formula of calculating the exact online attack gradient for a general smooth
function F (wt). In this section, we show how this gradient can be efficiently w.r.t. all points in the
data stream using a recurrent prefix.
The computation for the case of i ≥ t and i = t− 1 in Equation 5 is straightforward once F (wt)
is known, so we focus at computing the gradient for all i < t−1. We call ξi the prefix of ∂F (wt)/∂xi,
where
ξi =
∂F (wt)
∂wt
∂wt
∂wt−1
· · · ∂wi+2
∂wi+1
(6)
and for all i < t− 1, we have
∂F (wt)
∂xi
= ξi
∂wi+1
∂xi
. (7)
Notice that the prefix has a simple recurrence relation
ξi = ξi+1
∂wi+2
∂wi+1
, (8)
so it is more efficient to first find the prefix ξi for all i < t− 1 and then find ∂F (wt)/∂xi from ξi
than to compute each ∂F (wt)/∂xi from scratch. Notice that ∂F (wt)/∂wt and each ξi is a vector of
dimension d. Finding ∂wi+2∂wi+1 and
∂wi+1
∂xi
for a particular i takes O(d2) time each, and computing ξi
for all i involves making O(T ) vector-matrix multiplications, each taking O(d2) time. Therefore the
computation complexity of finding all gradients is O(Td2).
A.2 Gradient Computation for Online Logistic Regression
We now instantiate the gradient computation with the objective function for online logistic regression
using OGD. Recall that the attacker’s objective L(wt) at time t is the negative logistic loss of the
classifier with weight wt over a label-flipped validation set Svalidinv, i.e.
L(wt) =
∑
(x,y)∈Svalidinv
− log(1 + exp(−ywTt x)). (9)
The gradient calculation procedure in Equation 5 requires ∂L(wt)∂wt ,
∂ws+1
∂ws
for all 1 ≤ s < t and ∂wi+1∂xi
for all 0 ≤ i < t, which can be found as follows:
∂L(wt)
∂wt
=
∑
(x,y)∈Svalidinv
yx
1 + exp(ywTt x)
, (10)
∂ws+1
∂ws
= (1− 2ληs)I− ηs
(
exp(ysw
T
s xs)
[1 + exp(yswTs xs)]
2
)
xsx
T
s , (11)
and
∂wi+1
∂xi
= −ηi
( −yiI
1 + exp(yiwTi xi)
+
exp(yiw
T
i xi)
[1 + exp(yiwTi xi)]
2
xiw
T
i
)
, (12)
where λ is the regularization constant of OGD and ηi is the learning rate of OGD at time step i.
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A.3 Attack Algorithms Descptions and Pseudocodes.
In order to simplify the algorithm pseudocode, we introduce the following notations.
First, we denote the attacker’s objective function over a training stream S as L(S). Recall that
in Section A.2, we use L(wt) to represent the attacker’s objective function at time t, where wt is the
model parameter of the online logistic regression classifier at time t trained on stream S. Then we
have L(S) = L(wT ) for the semi-online setting and L(S) =
∑T
t=1 L(wt) for the fully-online setting.
Second, we use Sa:b to represent the substream of S from Sa to Sb−1, and use Sa:b:i to represent
the substream containing every i-th point in S from Sa to Sb−1. If a substream can be represented
by concatenating two above mentioned types of substreams, then its subscript will be a list of its
component substream’s subscript separated by comma. For example, Sa:b,b:c:i means a substream
with points from Sa to Sb−1 and then every i-th point from Sb to Sc−1.
Lastly, we use 0 to denote the initial step size of gradient ascent and niter to denote the gradient
ascent step size at step niter. The step size niter is a function of 0 and niter, which decays at the
rate of O(1/
√
niter).
Algorithm 1 Incremental Attack(S, K, 0, maxiter)
S: the original training stream, 0: initial gradient ascent step size, K: the attacker’s budget,
maxiter : maximum number of iterations for gradient ascent.
niter = 0
T = |S|
hasPerturbed = [0]× T
nperturbed = 0
while (niter < maxiter) and (nperturbed <= K ) do
xi = arg maxxk∈S ||∂L(S)∂xk ||2
xi = projF (xi + niter
∂L(S)
∂xi
)
hasPerturbed[i] = 1
niter = niter + 1
nperturbed = sum(hasPerturbed)
end while
return S
B Additional Experiment Description and Result Plots
B.1 Dataset Size and Initial Learning Rate of Online Learners
For each data set, we select a training set of size 400 which is presented to the learner as the input
stream, and a separate test set which is used for evaluation. The attacker also has a held-out
validation set of size 200, and the learner has a separate held-out set of the same size as the training
set, which is used to initialize the classifier w0.
For 2D-Gaussian mixtures, MNIST 1 v.s. 7 and fashion MNIST sandals v.s. boots datasets,
the initial learning rate of online learner is η0 = 0.005 for Constant learning rate and η0 = 0.1 for
Slow Decay and Fast Decay. For UCI Spamset, the initial learning rate is η0 = 0.01 for Constant,
η0 = 0.1 for Slow Decay and η0 = 0.2 for Fast Decay. These parameter ensure that in all cases, the
online learner has more than 90% test accuracy when run on the clean data stream.
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Algorithm 2 Interval Attack(S, K, 0, maxiter, s)
S: the original training stream, 0: initial gradient ascent step size, K: the attacker’s budget,
which is also the length of the sliding window, maxiter : maximum number of iterations for
gradient ascent, s: the step size for grid searching the best attack window.
T = |S|
Satt = S
for t ∈ range (0, T − l, s) do
S′ = S
S′t:t+K = Find-Best-Modification-Over-Substream(S
′, 0, maxiter, S′t:t+K)
if L(S′) > L(Satt) then
Satt = S
′
end if
end for
return Satt
Algorithm 3 Teach-and-Reinforce Attack(S, K, 0, maxiter, α)
S: the original training stream, 0: initial gradient ascent step size, K: the attacker’s budget,
max_iter: maximum number of iterations for gradient ascent, α: fraction of attack budget used
for teaching.
T = |S|
s = d T−αK(1−α)K e
S0:αK,αK:T :s = Find-Best-Modification-Over-Substream(S, 0, maxiter, S0:αK,αK:T :s)
return S
Algorithm 4 Find-Best-Modification-Over-Substream(S, 0, maxiter, Smodify)
S: the original training stream, 0: initial gradient ascent step size, max_iter: maximum number
of iterations for gradient ascent, Smodify: the substream to be modified to optimize the attacker’s
objective.
niter = 0
while niter < maxiter do
for x ∈ Smodify do
x = projF (x+ niter∂L(S)/∂x)
end for
niter = niter + 1
end while
return Smodify
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B.2 Efficacy of Attack Plots
Only the result of attacks against Slow Decay online learner is presented in the main text due to the
page limit. In this section, we show the plots of test accuracy against fraction of points modified for
all datasets and all online learner learning rates.
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Figure. 2: Results for 2d Gaussian mixtures. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Fully-online.
Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 3: Results for MNIST. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Fully-online. Left to right:
Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 4: Fashion MNIST Sandals v.s. Boots. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Fully-online.
Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 5: UCI Spambase. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Fully-online. Left to right:
Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
B.3 Distribution of Attack Positions
In Table 1 in the experiment section, we qualitatively summarize the most frequent attack positions
chosen by each online attack. In this section, we show the histogram plots of attack positions chosen
by the Incremental and Interval attacks.
The entire length T window is divided into 20 equal-size bins. Each bar represents the frequency
of modified points lying in the bin, normalized by the total number of points attacked in all repeated
experiment. For Incremental attack, all modified points before reaching maximum attack budget of
each series or maximum number of iteration are counted. For interval attack, we count the modified
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points when the attack budget is 160 for 2-D Gaussian mixtures, 40 for MNIST and fashion MNIST,
and 80 for UCI Spamset.
B.3.1 2D Gaussian Mixtures
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Figure. 6: Results for 2d Gaussian mixtures, Incremental Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row:
Full-online. Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 7: Results for 2d Gaussian mixtures, Interval Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row:
Full-online. Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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B.3.2 MNIST 1 v.s. 7
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Figure. 8: Results for MNIST, Incremental. Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Full-online.
Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 9: Results for MNIST, Interval Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Full-online. Left to
right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 10: Fashion MNIST Sandals v.s. Boots, Incremental Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row:
Full-online. Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 11: Fashion MNIST Sandals v.s. Boots, Interval Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row:
Full-online. Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
B.3.4 UCI Spambase
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819
Bin Index
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
%
 o
f A
tta
ck
 S
ite
s i
n 
th
e 
Bi
n
20
Figure. 12: UCI Spam Dataset, Incremental Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Full-online.
Left to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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Figure. 13: UCI Spam Dataset, Interval Top row: Semi-online, Bottom row: Full-online. Left
to right: Slow Decay, Fast Decay, Constant
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